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By Christopher Simpson
Turning to a consideration of CIA-sponsored psychological warfare
studies, one finds a wealth of evidence showing that projects
secretly funded by the CIA played a prominent role in U.S. mass
communication studies during the middle and late 1950s. The secrecy
that surrounds any CIA operation makes complete documentation
impossible, but the fragmentary information that is now available
permits identification of several important examples.
The first is the work of Albert Hadley Cantril (better known
as Hadley Cantril), a noted "founding father" of modem
mass
communication studies. Cantril was associate director of the
famous Princeton Radio Project from 1937 to 1939, a founder and
longtime director of Princeton's Office of Public Opinion Research,
and a founder of the Princeton Listening Center, which eventually
evolved into the CIA-financed Foreign Broadcast Information Service.
Cantril's work at Princeton is widely recognized as "the first
time
that academic social science took survey research seriously, and
it
was the first attempt to collect and collate systematically survey
findings." 70 Cantril's The Psychology of Radio, written with
Gordon
Allport, is often cited as a seminal study in mass communication
theory and research, and his surveys of public opinion in European
and Third World countries defined the subfield of international
public opinion studies for more than two decades.
Cantril's work during the first decade after World War II focused
on elaborating Lippmann's concept of the stereotypethe "pictures
in our heads," as Lippmann put it, through which people are
said
to deal with the world outside their immediate experience. Cantril
specialized in international surveys intended to determine how
factors such as class, nationalism, and ethnicity affected the
stereotypes present in a given population, and how those stereotypes
in turn affected national behavior in various countries, particularly
toward the United States. 71 Cantril's work, while often revealing
the "human face" of disaffected groups, began with the
premise that
the United States' goals and actions abroad were fundamentally good
for the world at large. If U.S. acts were not viewed in that light
by foreign audiences, the problem was that they had misunderstood
our good intentions, not that Western behavior might be fundamentally
flawed.
Cantril's career had been closely bound up with U.S. intelligence
and clandestine psychological operations since at least the late
1930s. The Office of Public Opinion Research, for example, enjoyed
confidential contracts from the Roosevelt administration for research
into U.S. public opinion on the eve of World War 11. Cantril went
on
to serve as the senior public opinion specialist of the Office of
the
Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (an early U.S. intelligence
agency led by Nelson Rockefeller and focusing on Latin America),
of
the World War II Office of War Information, and, in a later period,
as an adviser to President Eisenhower on the psychological aspects
of foreign policy. During the Kennedy administration, Cantril helped
reorganize the U.S. Information Agency. 72
According to the New York Times, the CIA provided Cantril and his
colleague Lloyd Free with $1 million in 1956 to gather intelligence
on popular attitudes in countries of interest to the agency. 73 The
Rockefeller Foundation appears to have laundered the money for
Cantril, because Cantril repeatedly claimed in print that the
monies had come from that source. 74 However, the Times and
Cantril's longtime partner, Lloyd Free, confirmed after Cantril's
death that the true source of the funds had been the CIA. 75
Cantril's first target was a study of the political potential of
"
protest" voters in France and Italy, who were regarded as
hostile
to U.S. foreign Policy. 76 That was followed by a 1958 tour of the
Soviet Union under private, academic cover, to gather information
on the social psychology of the Soviet population and on "mass"
relationships with the Soviet elite. Cantril's report on this topic
went directly to then president Eisenhower; its thrust was that
treating the Soviets firmly, but with greater respect -- rather than
openly ridiculing them, as had been Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles' practice -- could help improve East-West relations. 77
Later Cantril missions included studies of Castro's supporters in
Cuba and reports on the social psychology of a series of countries
that could serve as a checklist of CIA interventions of the period:
Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, India, Nigeria, Philippines,
Poland, and others. 78
An important focus of Cantril's work under the CIA's contract
were surveys of U.S. domestic public opinion on foreign policy and
domestic political issues -- a use of government funds many observers
would argue was illegal. 79 There, Cantril introduced an important
methodological innovation by breaking out political opinions by
respondents' demographic characteristics and their place on a U.S.
ideological spectrum he had devised -- a forerunner of the political
opinion analysis techniques that would revolutionize U.S. election
campaigns during the 1980s. 80
A second-and perhaps more important -- example of the CIA's role
in
U.S. mass communication studies during the 1950s was the work of
the
Center for International Studies (CENIS) at MIT. The CIA became the
principal funder of this institution throughout the 1950s, although
neither the CENIS nor the CIA is known to have publicly provided
details on their relationship. It has been widely reported, however,
that the CIA financed the initial establishment of the CENIS; that
the agency underwrote publication of certain CENIS studies in both
classified and nonclassified editions; that CENIS served as a conduit
for CIA funds for researchers at other institutions, particularly
the
Center for Russian Research at Harvard; that the director of CENIS,
Max Millikan, had served as assistant director of the CIA immediately
prior to his assumption of the CENIS post; and that Millikan served
as a "consultant to the Central Intelligence Agency," as
State
Department records put it, during his tenure as director of CENIS.
81
In 1966, CENIS scholar Ithiel de Sola Pool acknowledged that CENIS
"
has in the past had contracts with the CIA," though he insisted
the
CIA severed its links with CENIS following a bitter scandal in the
early 1960s. 82
CENIS emerged as one of me most important centers of communication
studies midway through the 1950s, and it maintained that role for
the remainder of the decade. According to CENIS's official account,
the funding for its communications research was provided by a four-
year, $850,000 grant from the Ford Foundation, which was distributed
under the guidance of an appointed planning committee made up of
Hans Speier (chair), Jerome Bruner, Wallace Carroll, Harold Lasswell,
Paul Lazarsfeld, Edward Shils, and Ithiel de Sola Pool (secretary).
83
It is not known whether Ford's funds were in fact CIA monies. The
Ford
Foundation's archives make clear, however, that the foundation was
at
that time underwriting the costs of the CIA's principal propaganda
project aimed at intellectuals, the Congress for Cultural Freedom,
with a grant of $500,000 made at CIA request, and that the Ford
Foundation's director, John McCloy (who will be remembered here for
his World War II psychological warfare work), had established a
regular liaison with the CIA for the specific purpose of managing
Ford Foundation cover for CIA projects. 84 Of the men on CENIS's
communication studies planning committee, Edward Shils was
simultaneously a leading spokesman for the CIA-backed Congress for
Cultural Freedom Project; Hans Speier was the RAND Corporation's
director of social science research; and Wallace Carroll was a
journalist specializing in national security issues who had produced
a series of classified reports on clandestine warfare against the
Soviet Union for U.S. military intelligence agencies. 85 In short,
CENIS communication studies were from their inception closely bound
up with both overt and covert aspects of U.S. national security
strategy of the day.
The CENIS program generated the large majority of articles on
psychological warfare published by leading academic journals during
the second half of the 1950s. CENIS's dominance in psychological
warfare studies during this period was perhaps best illustrated by
two special issues of POQ published in the spring of 1956 and the
fall of 1958. Each was edited by CENIS scholars-by Ithiel de Sola
Pool and Frank Bonilla and by Daniel Lerner, respectively -- and
each
was responsible for the preponderance of POQ articles concerning
psychological warfare published that year. The collective titles
for
the special issues were "Studies in Political Communications" and
"
Attitude Research in Modernizing Areas." 86
CENIS scholars and members of the CENIS planning committee such
as Harold Ina", Y. B. Damle, Claire Zimmerman, Raymond Bauer,
and Suzanne Keller 87 and each of the special issue editors" provided
most of the content. They drew other articles from studies that CENIS
had contracted out to outside academics, such as a content analysis
of
U.S. and Soviet propaganda publications by Ivor Wayne of BSSR and
a study of nationalism among the Egyptian elite by Patricia Kendall
of
BASR that was based on data gathered during the earlier Voice of
America studies in the Mideast. 89
The purported dangers to the United States of "modernization" or
economic development in the Third World emerged as the most important
theme of CENIS studies in international communication as the decade
of the 1950s drew to a close. Practically without exception, CENIS
studies coincided with those issues and geographic areas regarded
as
problems by U.S. intelligence agencies: "agitators" in
Indonesia,
student radicals in Chile, "change-prone" individuals in
Puerto Rico,
and the social impact of economic development in the Middle East.
90
CENIS also studied desegregation of schools in Little Rock, Arkansas,
as an example of "modernization." 91
In these reports, CENIS authors viewed social change in developing
countries principally as a management problem for the United States.
Daniel Lerner contended that "urbanization, industrialization,
secularization [and] communications" were elements of a typology
of
modernization that could be measured and shaped in order to secure
a desirable outcome from the point of view of the U.S. government.
" How can these modernizing societies-in-a-hurry maintain stability?"
Lerner asked. "Whence will come the compulsions toward responsible
formation and expression of opinion on which a free participant
society depends?" 92
In The Passing of Traditional Society and other texts, Lerner
contended that public "'participation' [in power] through opinion
is spreading before genuine political and economic participation" in
societies in developing countries 93 -- a clear echo of Lippmann's
earlier thesis. This created a substantial mass of people who were
relatively informed through the mass media, yet who were socially
and economically disenfranchised, and thus easily swayed by the
appeals of radical nationalists, Communists, and other "extremists."
As in Lippmann's analysis, mass communication played an important
role in the creation of this explosive situation, as Lerner saw it,
and in elite management of it. He proposed a strategy modeled in
large part on the campaign in the Philippines that combined "white"
and "black" propaganda, economic development aid, and U.S.-trained
and financed counterinsurgency operations to manage these problems
in a manner that was "responsible" from the point of view
of the
industrialized world.
This "development theory," which combined propaganda,
counter-
insurgency warfare, and selective economic development of targeted
regions, was rapidly integrated into U.S. psychological warfare
practice worldwide as the decade drew to a close. Classified U.S.
programs employing "Green Beret" Special Forces troops
trained in
what was termed "nation building" and counterinsurgency
began in
the mountainous areas of Cambodia and Laos. 94 Similar projects
intended to win the hearts and minds of Vietnam's peasant population
through propaganda, creation of "strategic hamlets," and
similar
forms of controlled social development under the umbrella of U.S.
Special Forces troops can also be traced in part to Lerner's work,
which was in time elaborated by Wilbur Schramm, Lucian Pye, Ithiel
de Sola Pool, and others. 95 Lerner himself became a fixture at
Pentagon-sponsored conferences on U.S. psychological warfare in the
Third World during the 1960s and 1970s, lecturing widely on the
usefulness of social science data for the design of what has since
come to be called U.S. -sponsored low-intensity warfare abroad. 96
The Special Operations Research Office's 1962 volume The U.S.
Army's Limited-War Mission and Social Science Research and the
well-publicized controversy surrounding Project Camelot 97 show
that the brutal U.S. counterinsurgency wars of the period grew out
of earlier psychological warfare projects, and that their tactics
were shaped in important part by the rising school of development
theory. 98 Further, the promises integral to that theory -- namely,
that U. S. efforts to control development in the Third World, if
skillfully handled, could benefit the targets of that intervention
while simultaneously advancing U.S. interests -- were often
publicized by the USIA, by the Army's mass media, at various
academic conferences, and in other propaganda outlets. In other
words, as the government tested in the field the tactics advocated
by Lerner, Pool, and others, the rationalizations offered by these
same scholars became propaganda themes the government promoted to
counter opposition to U.S. intervention abroad. 99
The important point with regard to CENIS is the continuing, inbred
relationship among a handful of leading mass communication scholars
and the U.S. military and intelligence community. Substantially the
same group of theoreticians who articulated the early cold war
version of psychological warfare in the 1950s reappeared in the
1960s to articulate the Vietnam era adaptation of the same concepts.
More than a half-dozen noted academics followed this track: Daniel
Lerner, Harold Lasswell, Wilbur Schramm, John W. Riley, W. Phillips
Davison, Leonard. Cottrell, and Ithiel de Sola Pool, among others.
100
* Excerpts from The Science of Coercion: Communication Research
and
Psychological Warfare 1945-1960, by Christopher Simpson (Oxford
University Press, 1994)
"Worldview Warfare" and World War II (pp.22-30)
The CIA and the Founding Fathers of Communication Studies (pp. 79-85)
Footnotes:
28. Brett Gary, "Mass
Communications Research, the Rockefeller
Foundation and the Imperatives of War 1939-1945," Research Reports
from
the Rockefeller Archive Center (North Tarrytown, NY, Spring 1991),
p. 3;
and Brett Gary, "American Liberalism and the Problem of Propaganda," Ph.D.
diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1992. Gary's work is the first
thorough
study, so far as I am aware, of the important role of the Rockefeller
Foundation in crystallizing paradigms for communication studies.
29. John Marshall
(ed.), "Needed Research in Communication" (1940),
folder 2677, box 224, Rockefeller Archives, Pocantico Hills, NY,
cited
in Gary, American Liberalism.
30. Gary, "American Liberalism and the Problem of Propaganda."
31. Ladislas Farago, German Psychological Warfare (New York: Putnam,
1941). For a history of the origin of the term, see William Daugherty,
"
Changing Concepts," in Daugherty and Janowitz, Psychological
Warfare
Casebook, p. 12.
32. Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, pp. 5-8, 23-37.
33. Ibid., p. 6.
34. Anthony Cave Brown (ed.), The Secret War Report of the OSS (New
York:
Berkeley, 1976), pp. 42-63. There is a large literature on the OSS.
For a
reliable overview of the agency's activities, including basic data
on its
establishment and leadership, see Richard Harris Smith, OSS (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1972).
35. Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, pp. 7-14; and Edward Lilly,
" The Psychological Strategy Board and Its Predecessors: Foreign Policy
Coordination 1938-1953," in Gaetano Vincitorio (ed.), Studies
in Modern
History (New York: St. Johns University Press, 1968), p. 346.
36. Kai Bird,
The Chairman: John J. McCloy (New York: Simon & Schuster,
1992).
37. Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, pp. 8-18; for an extended
discussion, see Daniel Lerner, Sykewar: Psychological Warfare Against
Germany, D-Day to VE-Day (New York: George Stewart, 1948).
38. On Poole's role in the establishment of Public Opinion Quarterly,
see Harwood Childs, "The First Editor Looks Back," POQ,
21, no. I (Spring
1957): 7-13. On Poole's work at the Foreign Nationalities Branch
of the
OSS, see (Anthony Cave Brown (ed.), Secret War Report of the OSS
(New
York: Berkley, 1976), chapter 2. On Leighton, see Alexander Leighton,
Human Relations in a Changing World (New York: Dutton, 1949). On
Mead,
see Carleton Mabee, "Margaret Mead and Behavioral Scientists
in World War
II: Problems of Responsibility, Truth and Effectiveness," Journal
of the
History of the Behavioral Sciences 23 (January 1987Y On Stouffer,
see now
49 Mom On Cantril, see Hadley Cantril, "Evaluating the Probable
Reactions
to the Landing in North Africa in 1942: A Case Study," POQ,
29, no. 3
(Fall 1965): 400-410.
39. On Roper and on Elmo Wilson, also of the Roper organization,
see Jean
Converse, Survey Research in the United States (Berkeley: University
of
Califomia Press, 1987), pp. 171-72. On Doob and Leites, see Daniel
Lerner
(ed.), Propaganda in War and Crisis (New York: George Stewart, 1951),
pp.
vii-viii. On Kluckhohn, Leighton, Lowenthal, and Schramm, see Daugherty
and Janowitz, Psychological Warfare Casebook, pp. xiii-xiv. On Speier,
Contemporary Authors, Vol. 21-24, p. 829. On Barrett, Edward Barrett,
Truth Is Our Weapon (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1953), pp. 31-32.
After
his death, the Associated Press identified Barrett as a former member
of the OSS, though Barrett omitted that information from biographical
statements published during his lifetime; see "Edward W. Barrett
Dies;
Started Columbia Journalism Review," Washington Post, October
26, 1989.
For more on the OWI, see also Allan Winkler, The Politics of Propaganda:
The Office of War Information 1942-1945 (New Haven: Yale University
Press,
1978); and Leonard Doob, "Utilization of Social Scientists in
the
Overseas Branch of the Office of War Information," American
Political
Science Review, 41, no. 4 (August 1947): 49-67.
40. Converse, Survey Research in the United States, pp. 163, 172.
41. Ibid., p. 309.
42. On Leites
and Eulau, see Wilbur Schramm, "The Beginnings
of
Communication Study in the United States," in Everett Rogers
and Francis
Balle (eds.), The Media Revolution in America and Western Europe
(Norwood,
NJ: Ablex, 1985), p. 205; and Harold Lasswell and Nathan Leites,
Language
of Politics (New York: George Stewart, 1949), p. 298.
43. Nathan Leites
and Ithiel de Sola Pool, "The Response of
Communist
Propaganda," in Lasswell and Leites, Language of Politics, pp.
153, 334.
44. Roger Wimmer and Joseph Dominick, Mass Media Research (Belmont,
CA:
Wadsworth, 1987Y p. 165.
45. On Paley, Jackson, Padover, Riley, Janowitz, Lerner, and Gurfein,
see Lerner, Sykewar, pp. 439-43. On Davison, see Daugherty and Janowitz,
Psychological Warfare Casebook, p. xii. On Shils, see Lerner, Propaganda
in War, p. viii.
46. On Davison and Padover, see Daugherty and Janowitz, Psychological
Warfare Casebook, pp. xii-xiii. On Gurfein and Janowitz, see Smith,
OSS,
pp. 86, 217.
47. On Langer, Cater, and Marcuse, see Smith, OSS, pp. 17, 23, 25,
217. On Barrett, see -Edward I Barren Dies; Started Columbia Journalism
Review." On Becker and Inkeles, see Daugherty and Janowitz,
Psychological
Warfare Casebook, pp. xi-xii. For a fascinating early memoir of the
role
of psychology and social psychology in OSS training and operations,
see
William Morgan, The OSS and I (New York: Norton, 1957).
48. Robin Winks, Cloak and Gown: Scholars in the Secret War, 1939-1961
(New York: Morrow, 1987), pp. 43-44, 79.
49. On Samuel Stouffer's Morale Branch, see Samuel Stouffer, Arthur
Lumsdaine, Marion Lumsdaine, Robin Williams, M. Brewster Smith, Irving
Janis, Shirley Star, and Leonard Cottrell, The American Soldier
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 149Y pp. 3-53; and John
Clausen, "Research on the American Soldier as a Career Contingency,"
Social Psychology Quarterly 47, no. 2 (1984): 207-13. On the OSS,
see
Barry Katz, Foreign Intelligence: Research and Analysis in the Office
of Strategic Services, 1952-1945 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1989): and Bernard David Rifkind, "OSS and Franco-American
Relations 1942-1945" Ph.D. diss., George Washington University,
1983,
pp. 318-36. On psychological operations in the Pacific theater, see
Leighton, Human Relations in a Changing World.
50. Clausen, "Research on the American Soldier."
51. Ibid., p. 210.
52. Ibid., p. 212.
53. Barrett, Truth, p. 31fn.
54. "Edward W. Barrett Dies; Started Columbia Journalism Review."
55. Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt
School and the Institute for Social Research, 1923-1950 (Boston:
Little,
Brown, 1973); and Katz, Foreign Intelligence, pp. 29ff.
...
70. Information
on Cantril in this paragraph is from "Cantril,
[Albert]
Hadley," National Cyclopedia of American Biography, Vol. 55,
pp. 211-12.
71. See, for example, William Buchanan and Hadley Cantril, How Nations
See Each Other (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1972), pp. 91-101; or Hadley
Cantril, The Politics of Despair (New York: Basic Books, 1958).
72. "Cantril,
[Albert] Hadley. See also collection of Psychological
Strategy Board correspondence with Cantril, including Cantril's oblique
reference to what appears to be clandestine CIA sponsorship and editing
of his pamphlet The Goals of the Individual and the Hopes of Humanity
(1951; published by Institute for Associated Research, Hanover, NH)
in
Cantril note of October 22, 195 1; in Hadley Cantril correspondence,
Psychological Strategy Board, Truman Library, Independence, MO.
73. John M. Crewdson
and Joseph Treaster, "Worldwide Propaganda
Network
Built by the CIA" New York Times, December 26, 1977.
74. Hadley Cantril, The Human Dimension: Experiences in Policy Research
(New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1967), pp. 131-32,
145.
75. Crewdson and Treaster, "Worldwide Propaganda Network."
76. Hadley Cantril and David Rodnick, Understanding the French Left
(Princeton: Institute for International Social Research, 1956).
77. Cantril, The Human Dimension, pp. 134-43.
78. Cantril, The Politics of Despair; Cantril, The Human Dimension,
pp. 1-5, 144.
79. Lloyd Free and Hadley Cantril, The Political Beliefs of Americans
(New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1967). On the question
of legality, note that the CIA's charter bars the agency from "police,
subpoena, lawenforcement powers or internal security functions," a
phrase that most observers contend prohibits the CIA from collecting
intelligence on U.S. citizens inside the United States. On this point,
see Thomas Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and
the CIA (New York: Pocket Books, 1979), pp. 315-17, 367-70, concerning
the CIA's Operation Chaos.
80. For an example
of a similar, later technique, see "Redefining
the
American Electorate," Washington Post, October 1, 1987, p. At
2, with
data provided by the Times Mirror-Gallup Organization.
81. On CIA funding of CENIS, see Victor Marchetti and John Marks,
The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence (New York: Dell, 1974), p. 181;
and David Wise and Thomas Ross, The Invisible Government (New York:
Vintage, 1974), p. 244. On CIA funding of studies, see Marchetti
and
Marks, The CIA, p. 18 1. For an example of a major study reported
to
have been underwritten by the CIA, see W. W. Rostow and Alfred Levin,
The Dynamics of Soviet Society (New York: Norton, 1952). On CENIS
as
a conduit of CIA funds, see Wise and Ross, The Invisible Government,
p. 244. On Millikan's role, see U.S. Department of State, Foreign
Service Institute, "Problems of Development and Internal Defense"
(Country Team Seminar, June 11, 1962).
82. Ithiel de
Sola Pool, "The Necessity for Social Scientists
Doing
Research for Governments," Background 10, no. 2 (August 1966):
114-15.
83. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for International
Studies, A Plan for Research in International Communications World
Politics, 6, no. 3 (April 1954): 358-77; MIT, CENIS, The Center for
International Studies: A Description (Cambridge: MIT, July 1955).
84. Don Price Oral History, pp. 61-70, and Don Price memo, May 21,
1954 (appendix to oral history), Ford Foundation Archives, New York.
The archival evidence concerning this aspect of the Ford Foundation's
relationship with the CIA was first brought to light by Kai Bird.
85. On Shils, see Peter Coleman, The Liberal Conspiracy (New York:
Free Press, 1989), pp. 98-209 passim. On Speier, see, Hans Speier,
"
Psychological Warfare Reconsidered," RAND paper no. 196, February
5,
1951; Hans Speier, "International Political Communication: Elite
and
Mass," World Politics (April 1952 [RAND paper no. P-270], Hans
Speier
and W. Phillips Davison, "Psychological Aspects of Foreign Policy,"
RAND paper no. P-615, December 15, 1954. Speier's other contemporary
work that has since come to light includes several studies of Soviet
response to West German rearmament, Soviet political tactics involving
nuclear threats, a report on the American Soldier series, and a
commentary on political applications of game theory. Speier died
February 17, 1990, in Sarasota, Florida; see "Hans Speier, Sociologist,"
Washington Post, March 2, 1990. On Carroll, see Wallace Carroll,
The
Army's Role in Current Psychological Warfare (top secret, declassified
following author's mandatory review request), February 24, 1949,
box 10, tab 61, entry 154, RG 319, U.S. National Archives, Washington,
DC; Wallace Carroll, "It Takes a Russian to Beat a Russian," Life,
December 19, 1949, pp. 80-86; "CIA Trained Tibetans in Colorado,
New
Book Says," New York Times, April 19, 1973.
86. Ithiel de
Sola Pool and Frank Bonilla (eds.), "A Special
Issue on
Studies in Political Communication," 20, no. I (Spring 1956);
Daniel
Lerner (ed.), "Special Issue: Attitude Research in Modernizing
Areas,"
22, no. 3 (Fall 1958).
87. In 20, no.
I (Spring 1956): Harold Isaacs, "Scratches on
Our Minds,"
p. 197; Y. B. Damle, "Communication of Modem Ideas and Knowledge
in
[East] Indian Villages," p. 257; Claire Zimmerman and Raymond
Bauer,
"
The Effect of an Audience upon What Is Remembered," p. 238;
Suzanne
Keller, "Diplomacy and Communication," p. 176; and Harold
Isaacs,
"
World Affairs and U.S. Race Relations: A Note on Little Rock," 22,
no. 3 (Fall 1958): 364.
88. Ithiel de
Sola Pool, Suzanne Keller, and Raymond Bauer, "The
Influence of Foreign Travel on Political Attitudes of U.S. Businessmen,"
p. 161; Frank Bonilla, "When Is Petition 'Pressure'?" p.
39; Daniel
Lerner, "French Business Leaders Look at EDC," p. 212 --
all in 20,
no. 1 (Spring 1956); and Daniel Lerner, "Editors Introduction," p.
217;
Ithiel de Sola Pool and Kali Prasad, "Indian Student Images
of Foreign
People," p. 292; Frank Bonilla, "Elites and Public Opinion
in Areas of
High Social Stratification," p. 349; all in 22, no. 3 (Fall
1958).
89. Ivor Wayne, "American
and Soviet Themes and Values: A Content
Analysis of Themes in Popular Picture Magazines," p. 314; Patricia
Kendall, "The Ambivalent Character of Nationalism among Egyptian
Professionals," p. 277 -- all in 20, no. I (Spring 1956).
90. Guy Pauker, "Indonesian Images of Their National Self," p.
305;
Lucian Pye, "Administrators, Agitators and Brokers," p.
342; Alain
Girard, "The First Opinion Research in Uruguay and Chile," p.
251;
Kurt Back, "The ChangeProne Person in Puerto Rico," p.
330; Robert
Carlson, "To Talk with Kings," p. 224; Herbert Hyman et
al., "The
Values of Turkish College Youth," p. 275; Raymond Gastil, "Middle
Class Impediments to Iranian Modernization," p. 325; Gorden
Hirabayashi
and M. Fathalla El Kbatib, "Communication and Political Awareness
in
the Villages of Egypt," p. 357; A. J. Meyer, "Entrepreneurship
and
Economic Development in the Middle East," p. 391; Richard Robinson,
"
Turkey's Agrarian Revolution and the Problem of Urbanization," p.
397;
Lincoln Armstrong and Rashid Bashshur, "Ecological Patterns
and Value
Orientations in Lebanon," p. 406 -- all in 22, no. 3 (Fall 1958).
91. Isaacs, "World Affairs and U.S. Race Relations," p. 364.
92. Lerner, "Editor's Introduction," pp. 218, 219, 221.
93. Lerner and Pevsner, The Passing of Traditional Society, p. 396.
Emphasis added.
94. Special Operations Research Office, The U.S. Army's Limited-War
Mission, pp. 59-63, 69-77; Blum, The CIA, pp. 133-62.
95. On communications theorists' contributions to counterinsurgency,
see Special Operations Research Office, The U.S. Army's Limited-War
Mission, pp. 159-69 (Pye) and 199ff (Pool). See also Ithiel de Sola
Pool (ed.), Social Science Research and National Security (Washington,
DC: Smithsonian Institution [Office of Naval Research Project], 1963),
pp. 1-25 (Pool), 46-74 (Schramm), 148-66 (Pye).
96. Special Operations Research Office, The U.S. Army's Limited-War
Mission, pp. 282ff; see also U.S. Department of the Army, Art and
Science of Psychological Operations, pp. xvii, 47-53.
97. The Camelot Affair precipitated the first genuinely public
discussion of the collision between the professed humanitarian
values of modem social science and the actual ends to which it had
been put in the world political arena. In 1964, the U.S. Army hired
private U.S. social scientists to conduct a series of long-term
inquiries into the social structures, political and economic
resources, ethnic rivalries, communication infrastructures, and
similar basic data concerning developing countries considered
likely to see strong revolutionary movements during the 1960s. The
project exploded when nationalist and left-wing forces in Chile and
other targeted countries protested, labeling Camelot a de facto
espionage operation. Camelot contractors, notably sociologist Jesse
Bernard of American University, replied that the criticism was
"
laughable" because Camelot's had been "designed as a scientific
research project" in which me countries selected for study made
"
no difference." The argument escalated from there. See House
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Behavioral Sciences and the National
Security, Report No. 4, 89th Cong. 1st sess. (Washington, DC: GPO,
1965); Jesse Bernard, "Conflict as Research and Research as
Conflict,"
in Irving Louis Horowitz, The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot, rev.
ed. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1974), p. 129n.
98. Special Operations Research Office, The U.S. Army's Limited-War
Mission, pp. 282ff; see also U.S. Department of the Army, Art and
Science of Psychological Operations, pp. xvii, 47-53.
99. For example,
Executive Office of the President, "NSAM No.
308:
A Program to Promote Publicly U.S. Policies in Vietnam" (June
22,
1964); McGeorge Bundy, "NSAM No. 328: Military Actions in Vietnam"
(April 6, 1965); "NSAM No. 329: Establishment of a Task Force
on
Southeast Asian Economic and Social Development" (April 9, 1965);
and "NSAM No. 330: Expanded Psychological Operations in Vietnam"
(April 9, 1965); each was obtained via the Freedom of Information
Act from the U.S. Office of the Comptroller General.
100. On Lerner, Riley, Davison, Cottrell, and Pool, see Special
Operations Research Office, The U.S. Army's LimitedWar Mission,
pp. xvi, 151-59, 199-202, 282-86. On Pool, Davison, and Schramm,
see Pool, Social Science Research and National Security, pp. 1-74.
On Lasswell, see Harold Lasswell, World Revolutionary Elites:
Studies in Coercive Ideological Movements (Cambridge: MIT Press,
1966).
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